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Abstract. Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) allow remote com-
munication through the Internet using industrial protocols that were not
designed to work with external networks. To understand security issues
related to this practice, prior work usually relies on active scans by re-
searchers or services such as Shodan. While such scans can identify public
open ports, they are not able to provide details on configurations of the
system related to legitimate Industrial Traffic passing the Internet (e.g.,
source-based filtering in Network Address Translation or Firewalls). In
this work, we complement Shodan-only analysis with large-scale traffic
analysis at a local Internet Exchange Point (IXP), based on sFlow sam-
pling. This setup allows us to identify ICS endpoints actually exchanging
Industrial Traffic over the Internet. Besides, we are able to detect scan-
ning activities and what other type of traffic is exchanged by the systems
(i.e., IT traffic). We find that Shodan only listed less than 2% of hosts
that we identified as exchanging Industrial Traffic. Even with manually
triggered scans, Shodan only identified 7% of them as ICS hosts. This
demonstrates that active scanning-based analysis is insufficient to under-
stand current security practices in ICS communications. We show that
75.6% of ICS hosts rely on unencrypted communications without in-
tegrity protection, leaving those critical systems vulnerable to malicious
attacks.
Keywords: Industrial Control Systems · Traffic Measurement.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems are used to control and monitor industrial and critical
infrastructure such as power grids, nuclear and chemical plants, water treatment
systems and buildings. According to the Purdue model [37], which represents
the reference architecture model for the ICSs, these systems were supposed to
operate on air-gap environments, however, due to the rise of the Internet and
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Ethernet technologies the industrial business move towards the connection to
external networks, opening dangerous vulnerability surfaces. This digitization
process requires the adaptation of legacy protocols that were not designed with
security features (e.g., Modbus, DNP3, and BACnet) to the TCP/IP stack,
to allow operations such as remote communication. The lack of encryption and
authentication can be exploited for a malicious purpose such as data exfiltration,
impersonification, and service disrupting.
The research interest and effort on ICS security increased with the number of
incidents and the involvement of critical-infrastructures, from the most famous
Stuxnet [14] that affected an Iranian nuclear power plant to the more recent
Triton [13] that targeted Schneider Electric products. The list of famous attacks
includes also recent events such as [6, 9, 38]. As reported by [12, 20], the attacks
over the ICSs are growing year after year and the number of vulnerable devices
is still very high. Many researchers estimated the vulnerable ICS landscape by
looking for well-known ICS ports exposed to the Internet, by actively perform-
ing scanning of the IPv4 address space [15, 21] or leveraging public available
information [1, 2, 11, 17, 19] gathered by third-parties such as Shodan [33] and
Censys [10]. However, many ICSs could not be indexed due to the presence of
network devices like Network Address Translations (NATs) or Firewalls, leading
to an incomplete estimation of the vulnerable ICSs. In [23] the authors analyzed
the unprotected Industrial Traffic transmitted over the Internet, gathering infor-
mation about the security status of the host systems, but they didn’t investigate
their presence in public databases.
In this paper, we investigate the practical use of ICS protocols over the In-
ternet, most importantly to learn about security issues. In particular, we aim
to determine if scanning traffic (such as results from Shodan) provides accurate
estimates of the actual use of ICS protocols (i.e., Is Shodan enough? ). To achieve
this, we present a framework to accurately identify the ICS host transmitting
Industrial Traffic over the Internet, based on traffic observed at an IXP. We
compare and correlate the obtained results with the information from a promi-
nent scanner (Shodan). Our analysis results underline the lack of security in ICS
infrastructures, emphasizing the current vulnerabilities and threats.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
– We propose, implement and validate a framework to identify legitimate in-
dustrial traffic and scanning activities, based on sFlow sampled traffic pas-
sively gathered at an IXP.
– We demonstrate that our method allows to obtain a more detailed under-
standing of security practices in ICS, in particular related to site-to-site com-
munication with industrial protocols. We find that scanning results obtained
actively (or via Shodan) to not accurately represent security configurations
at the ICS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the
main concepts useful for the goal of the paper. Section 3 outlines our method-
ology to identify and filter ICS traffic based on sampled captures. Section 4
describes the data collection and the implementation of the filtering process.
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Section 5 and Section 6 illustrate respectively the results related to our research
questions and the results of additional analysis and insight. Section 7 discusses
our findings and Section 8 provides an overview of the related work. Finally,
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this Section we briefly recall the main concepts useful to understand the
remainder of the paper. In particular, in Section 2.1 we introduce the ICSs and
in Section 2.2 we recall the definition of Autonomous System (AS) and IXP
which represent the main entities of our system model.
2.1 Industrial Control Systems
ICS comprises devices that are used to monitor and control industrial processes.
Most ICSs fall into either a continuous process control system, typically man-
aged via Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), or Discrete Process Control
systems (DPC), that might use a PLC or some other batch process control de-
vice. An ICS is responsible for a vast amount of critical processes, consequently,
organizations need to adequately secure their infrastructures. The creation of
strong boundaries between business and process control networks can reduce
the number of vulnerabilities and attack pathways that an intruder may exploit
to gain unauthorized access into these critical systems.
The monitoring of the physical processes is performed through Cyber-Physical
devices. A CPS is an integration of computation with physical processes whose
behavior is defined by both the cyber and physical parts of the system. Embed-
ded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes, usually
with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa.
Historically, ICS networks were isolated from the Internet for security reasons
and used proprietary protocols whose specifications were not disclosed. From the
security point of view there was no possibility of remote access, so the risk of
cyber attacks was very low. However, in recent years, due to the growth of
smart manufacturing, ICSs have been connected to the Internet, opening new
dangerous surfaces of vulnerability.
2.2 ASs and IXPs
An Autonomous System (AS) consists of a group of IP prefixes under the con-
trol of a single well-defined administrative authority that defines the routing
policies, typically an Internet Service Provider (ISP), uniquely identified by its
Autonomous System Number (ASN). The routing within an AS is allowed via
Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) while the communication with other ASs re-
lies on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). An IXP is a network facility that
enables the interconnection and exchange of Internet traffic between more than
two independent ASs according to their BGP routing configurations. Its typical
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architecture consists of a single or multiple switches connected to the border
routers of the adherent ASs, ensuring benefits in terms of bandwidth, costs, and
latency.
3 ICS Security Assessment Through IXP
Our analysis relies on VSIX [35], a local IXP which manages the traffic circu-
lating in the North East of Italy. This environment allows us to collect packets
circulating through the Internet in a secure and privacy respectful way. In the
following, we detail our system model in Section 3.1, while in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3 we outline respectively the research questions of this paper and the
proposed framework for the traffic analysis.
3.1 System Model
We assume a system in which ICSs are connected to a local AS (e.g., as customers
of an ISP), and are using Industrial Traffic over the Internet for supervision and
control (depicted in Figure 1). The IXP provides the capability to sample traffic
to understand the used protocols and involved parties.
In the considered model, an attacker could be a malicious end host located
at another AS, or a Man-in-the-Middle attacker (e.g., by an ISP or IXP). The
former attacker needs to be active (e.g., scanning the well-known ICS ports),
while the latter is possibly passive. Their goals are to learn process data (i.e.,
eavesdrop), and/or manipulate the ICS actively (e.g., by changing or injecting
operational commands).
3.2 Research Questions, Challenges, and Goal
Our main goal is to investigate the practical use of ICS protocols over the Inter-
net, in particular with respect to security. The main questions are: RQ1: How
often (insecure) ICS protocols are used over the Internet? RQ2: How often are
ICS services exposed to third parties, in addition to the intended use by legitimate
parties?
The main challenge we faced is that legitimate use of ICS traffic cannot be
directly observed by third parties unless they are carrying the traffic (i.e., are in
a Man-in-the-Middle/MitM position). Even in that case, efficiently filtering for
ICS traffic out of large volumes of traffic can be challenging.
The outlined challenges raise the following additional research questions: If
ICS protocols are used or exposed, can we identify such hosts using active scan-
ning (e.g., Shodan), or IXP/based traffic collection? To which degree are results
of both complementing each other? In other words, RQ3: Is active-scanning based
enumeration of hosts a good estimator of (vulnerable) Industrial Traffic use on
the Internet?
For practical reasons, we focused our work on a geographical region in our
country served by a specific IXP.
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IXP
AS	X AS	Y
ICS	Host	A ICS	Host	B ICS	Host	C ICS	Host	D
AS	Z
ICS	Host	E
AS	K
ICS	ScannerICS	Scanner
Data	Collection	
and	Analysis
Fig. 1: System model: ICS at AS X, AS Y, and AS Z communicate over the IXP.
Scanners on the Internet (AS Z, AS K ), which can be malicious or benign, look
for exposed ICS services. The packets exchanged between two hosts belonging
to AS Y and AS Z could still pass through the IXP, even if AS Z is not directly
connected to it. We sat within the IXP network where we are able to collect and
analyze sampled packets.
3.3 Proposed Framework
We summarized the steps performed to address the research questions in Fig-
ure 2. The first step consists in the data collection and processing. Such data
comes from two different sources. The first one is real Internet traffic captured
at the local IXP, the second one are hosts information collected through Shodan
public database, used for the definition of the baseline to evaluate the traffic-
based approach. The main challenge of this step was to properly extract the
Industrial Traffic from the IXP traffic collection. To solve this, we implemented
a three-step filtering approach based on well-known tools (e.g., Wireshark) which
are able to identify both scanning and legitimate ICS activities. In the second
step, we analyzed the results of the first step to answer the research questions.
We analyzed the legitimate Industrial Traffic, compared the hosts identified with
the baseline, and investigated the exposure on Shodan of the hosts detected legit-
imately exchanging Industrial Traffic. Finally, to gather additional information
about the current ICS security practices and threats, we investigated the data
collected at the IXP to detect scanning activities and to deeply understand the
network behavior and architecture (e.g., presence of a NAT) of the hosts. A
port-scan approach, cannot identify industrial services hidden behind a NAT,
Firewall or VLAN, instead, it is possible from our position. The presence of
both Industrial and non-Industrial Traffic from a single host can be an indicator
of such network mechanisms.
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Research	Questions
Collected	Traffic	Insights
Scanning-Based	ICS	Hosts	Detection
Traffic-Based	ICS	Hosts	Detection
IXP	Data
Collection
Shodan	ICS	Data
Collection
Packet	Filtering
Host	filtering
Scanning	Traffic
Analysis
Hosts	
Comparison
Host	Exposure	on
Shodan
IT	Traffic
Analysis
Legitimate	Traffic
Analysis
Fig. 2: The proposed framework to compare the data collected at the IXP and
the information available on Shodan.
4 Implementation
In this Section we present the implementation of our framework of analysis. In
particular, Section 4.1 defines the baseline that we use to compare our approach
to a scan-based one and Section 4.2 outlines the packet filtering approach used
to identify the ICSs hosts.
4.1 Collection of the Shodan Baseline
We used Shodan to identify the ICS hosts exposed to the Internet within the
IXP area. We define the IXP area as the set of ASs directly connected to the
IXP itself. Due to the limited access to the Shodan services we collected all the
Italian ICS exposed according to the industrial-control-systems category offered
by the Shodan platform. However, the list of protocols offered in such category is
incomplete compared to our list, so we also collected the hosts indexed on Shodan
according to protocol-specific filtering rules (e.g., ports and common terms). We
then selected the ICSs of our interest discarding the hosts that do not belong to
an AS of the IXP area. We reported the results of the analysis in Table 1.
4.2 Packet Filtering
To identify the ICS protocols we applied a port-based filter according to the
most commonly used ones, using the official documentation of the protocols
and the ports list [18] as main references. We reported the considered protocols
in Appendix A, in Table 7, followed by their port ranges and the Wireshark
dissector availability. Due to the Wireshark limitations, we applied the following
three-step approach.
1. In the first step we identified the correctly dissected ICS traffic by Wireshark,
dividing scanning activities from legitimate activities.
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Hosts 1531 1382 1346 456 417 373 364 183 160 140 83 32 13 11 6 5 5 2 1
% 23.5 21.2 20.6 7 6.4 5.7 5.6 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.1
IXP
Hosts 206 50 70 16 37 2 3 10 26 4 6 7 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
% 47.8 11.3 15.9 3.6 8.4 0.4 0.7 2.3 5.7 0.9 1.4 1.6 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.2
Table 1: List of the ICS per-protocol exposed in Italy and IXP area according
to Shodan with the corresponding overall percentage.
(a) We used Wireshark to identify all the Industrial Protocols supported
and marked as not malformed;
(b) We cross-validated the data using nDPI [25], an open-source library
able to dissect a wide range of industrial and non-industrial protocols,
removing all the packets which were tagged as non-industrial protocols;
(c) We filtered out the packets where the IP-source is tagged as scanner by
Greynoise [16]. Greynoise is a security company that collects, labels, and
analyzes Internet-wide scan and attack data;
(d) We considered the difference between the results of b) and c) as legitimate
ICS traffic;
2. In the second step we identified scanning activities targeting the ports of the
protocols not correctly dissected in step 1.
(a) We used Wireshark to remove all the not malformed, industrial and non-
industrial protocols (e.g., SSL, HTTP), keeping the packets generally
tagged as TCP or UDP;
(b) We used nDPI to remove additional non-Industrial Traffic from the pre-
vious results;
(c) We used Greynoise to identify scanning activities;
3. In the third step we gather the results of step 1 and step 2.
(a) We merged the scanners activities identified and we tagged them as ICS
scanners;
(b) We considered the sum of the legitimate ICS traffic and the ICS scanners
as ICS traffic.
We reported the result of the three-step filtering process in Table 2.
5 Results
We collected data for a period of 31 days from the 14th of January 2020 to the
14th of February 2020 at the considered IXP. The traffic was sampled according
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Packets %
Total ∼1.6B
Port-based filtering 43584 0.0027
Step 1
Wireshark filtering 3188
nDPI validation 2075 65.1
Scanning activities 1360 42.6
Legitimate ICS traffic 715 22.4
Step 2
Wireshark filtering 32741
nDPI validation 26171 80
Scanning activities 3019 9,2
Step 3
ICS traffic 5094
ICS scanners 4379 86
Legitimate ICS traffic 715 14
Overall[%]
ICS traffic ∼0.0003
ICS scanners ∼0.0003
Legitimate ICS traffic ∼0.00005
Table 2: Packet filtering results step by step. Overall[%] represents the percentage
of industrial filtered traffic with respect to the total number of collected packets.
to the sFlow standard [32], with a sampling rate of 2
−12
and packet truncation
at 128 bytes. The sampling process provides an estimation of the effective traffic
passing through the exchange point [28], while the truncation gives access to the
full link layer, network layer, transport layer and few bytes of the payload. The
collection resulted in ∼1.6B packets for more than 189GB of data.
In the following Section we present the results of the analysis of the traffic
capture obtained after the collection phase. In particular, Section 5.1 discusses
the legitimate ICS traffic, Section 5.2 compares our approach with Shodan, while
Section 5.3 reports an analysis of the Shodan-indexed hosts.
5.1 Legitimate ICS Traffic
We identified 168 ICS endpoints and 12 different industrial protocols, with 8
hosts using two different ICS protocols. The percentage of legitimate ICS traffic
over the total number of packets is 5 ⋅ 10−5. In Appendix A, we reported that
MQTT and AMQP protocols together count more than 55% of the overall le-
gitimate ICS traffic. This result is not surprising since both the protocols are
also widely used for IoT communication in non-industrial environments. ANSI
C12.22 covers almost 21% of the overall number of packets, followed by Mod-
bus/TCP with 9% and Zigbee with 8%. Other very common ICS protocols as
Profinet, Ethercat, IEC60870-5-104 and Ethernet/IP together count less than
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h 62 32 16 15 10 10 8 8 6 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 176
hS 206 0 0 0 0 0 16 70 4 1 3 0 7 26 10 1 37 1 50 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 442
i 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
r 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - 0.4
Table 3: Comparison between the number of ICS hosts found with our approach
(i.e., h) and by Shodan (i.e., hS) within the IXP area. The value i represents the
number of hosts common to the two approaches and the value r represents the
result of the Equation 1.
7%. Another interesting result is that despite MQTT official documentation [5]
specifies port 8883, and AMQP port 5671 respectively, for communicating over
TLS, our results show that all the MQTT and AMQP communication rely on
insecure ports, implying all the relative vulnerabilities [3, 27].
5.2 Comparison with the Shodan Baseline
To address RQ3 we compared the hosts identified on Section 5.1 with the hosts
identified on Section 4.1. We define H as the set of ICS hosts detected by us and
HS as the set of ICS hosts identified by Shodan. Our interest is to identify the
number i = ∣H ∩HS∣ of ICS hosts commonly detected by the two approaches.
We quantified which method detected more ICS hosts by computing the ratio:
r = ∣H∣∣H ∪HS∣ = hh + hS − i (1)
where h is the cardinality of H, and hS is the cardinality of HS . The value of
r can be interpreted as follow: if r = 0 our approach did not detect any endpoint
compared to Shodan, if 0 < r < 0.5 Shodan did better than us, if r = 0.5 the two
methods detected the same number of ICS hosts, if 0.5 < r < 1 our approach
is better and if r = 1 we identified at least an endpoint while Shodan no one.
We reported the results in Table 3. Despite we detected an overall amount of
168 ICS hosts and 440 hosts were by Shodan, just 2 were common to both the
approaches, respectively an MQTT and a Modbus/TCP endpoint, meaning that
the two methods are complementary. Our approach, according to the resulting
values of r, performed better than Shodan for 8 protocols, 6 of which with a value
of 1. The port-scanning approach, instead, performed better for 12 protocols.
However, by further analysis 6 of them were not possible to detect following
our approach due to the limited number of Wireshark dissectors (as reported in
Appendix A).
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Product % Port %
MikroTik bandwidth-test server 25 443 11.8
Apache httpd 12.5 80 11.5
nginx 9 2000 7
Open SSH 9 8080 6
MQTT 7.9 22 4.1
Table 4: Top-5 port and product detected by Shodan.
5.3 Hosts Exposure on Shodan
Among the ICS hosts involved in a legitimate ICS communication, we were
interested in checking how many of them were also indexed by Shodan, and
what kind of information Shodan was able to gather (i.e., RQ2 ). We found that
64.3% of such hosts were successfully identified by Shodan and 11% of them
were found with ICS ports exposed, more specifically Modbus/TCP, MQTT,
and AMQP.
In Table 4 we reported the Top-5 products and exposed ports based on the
Shodan collected data. Due to the high percentage of Web Servers detected,
we investigated deeply to understand what kind of services these devices were
exposing. We found IP Cameras, Printers, Routers and Network Attached Stor-
age (NAS) login pages other than energy monitoring and alarm systems. In this
work we were not interested in performing any kind of active penetration test
to the identified devices. For this reason, we analyzed the Common Vulnerabili-
ties and Exposures (CVEs) information provided by Shodan to identify possible
vulnerabilities caused by unpatched systems or well-known critical products. We
found that 10.2% of the systems indexed were affected by at least one CVE. We
then associated with each vulnerability the corresponding Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System (CVSS) v2.0 score [24]. According to the National Institute
of Standard and Technology (NIST) the severity of a score between 0.0 -3.9 is
considered low, 4.0 -6.9 medium and 7.0 -10.0 high. We found an overall amount
of 207 CVEs, 30% of which have a score greater than 7.0 affecting 81% of the
vulnerable hosts, 4.3% greater than 8.0, 2.9% greater than 9, and 2.4% equal
to 10.0 all affecting 27.3% of the vulnerable hosts. We must note that all these
vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely.
5.4 Summary of Main Results
RQ1: How often (insecure) ICS protocols are used over the Internet? We ob-
served 12 different industrial protocols during our collection period. By analyz-
ing these 12 protocols, 6 of them (i.e., EtherCAT, PROFINET, IEC60870-5-104,
Ethernet/IP, Modbus/TCP, FF HSE) do not implement any encryption, authen-
tication or integrity protection features by design and were used by 59 hosts. In
addition, protocols such as MQTT and AMQP support TLS (enabling confiden-
tiality and authentication), but we did not see this being employed in practice.
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The use of insecure protocols and missing use of TLS affected an overall amount
of 127 hosts, meaning that 75.6% of the hosts are using vulnerable ICS commu-
nications.
RQ2: How often are ICS services exposed to third parties, in addition to the
intended use by legitimate parties? We found that only a small subset of hosts
that we identified as legitimately using ICS protocols (i.e., 7.1% corresponding
to 12 hosts) also have ICS protocols ports exposed to the public Internet. Fur-
thermore, for the hosts that we identified as legitimately using ICS protocols, we
found that a good subset (i.e., 64.3% corresponding to 108 hosts) also has gen-
eral IT ports exposed to the Internet. By analyzing these 108 hosts, 11 of them
were affected by at least a CVE, instead 9 of them were affected by different
CVEs with a CVSS score greater than 7.0.
RQ3: Is active-scanning based enumeration of hosts a good estimator of (vulner-
able) Industrial Traffic use on the Internet? The r value we calculated indicates
that Shodan finds three times as many hosts as our method, while the i value we
calculated indicates that only about 1.2% of the hosts collected by our frame-
work were also detected by Shodan. This means Shodan missed most hosts that
are actually implementing ICS protocols. We conclude that while Shodan re-
turns the higher number of hosts, even with manual direction to the right hosts
Shodan is largely unable to identify hosts that actually use industrial protocols
for legitimate applications.
6 Additional Analysis and Insights
In the following Section we reported further results we obtained beyond the re-
search questions defined is Section 3.2. In particular, we Section 6.1 provided a
detailed analysis of the origin of scanning campaigns. Section 6.2 reports an anal-
ysis of the hosts implementing both Industrial communication and non-Industrial
communication (i.e., IT traffic). Finally, Section 6.3 presents a validation proce-
dure for the IXP on which we relied on.
6.1 Scanning Activities
In this analysis, we associated any scanning activity identified during the packet
filtering process to the relative ICS protocol, according to the targeted port.
Scanned protocols. We identified a total of 442 different IPs performing scan-
ning activities. The most scanned port was 5683 used by CoAP with more than
50% of the scan packets, followed by BACnet/IP, Automated Tank Gauge (ATG)
systems and DNP3. Almost 30% of the scan packets were crafted with protocol-
specific requests, like readProperty function for BACnet/IP, GET /.well-known/core
for CoAP, List Identity for Ethernet/IP, Session Initiate Request for HART IP
and Controller Data Read for OMRON FINS. The remaining 70% of the pack-
ets consisted of 61% of UDP packets, 32% of simple SYN packets, 35% of RST
and less of the 1% for SYN-ACK and other combination, which confirms an
established TCP connection.
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Actors %
Unknown 55.1
Censys 35
Stretchoid.com 4.3
Shodan.io 4.3
Net Systems Research 4.3
Table 5: Top-5 Scanner actors we identified.
Scanning actors. We used the Greynoise platform [16] to tag the scanners as
Malicious, Benign or Unknown, according to their logged activities. Greynoise
reported the 3.5% of the host as Malicious, 37.4% as Benign and the remaining
59% as Unknown. A malicious actor, for instance, was associated with a behavior
indicating a Mirai or a Mirai-like variant infection, while another one was found
opportunistically scanning for Siemens PLC devices. We also identified well-
known services that periodically scan the Internet address space such as Shodan
and Censys [10], as reported in Table 5. In Appendix B we reported an analysis
of the origin of the scanning IP addresses. Instead, in Appendix A we reported
a detailed summarizing of the protocols scanned by malicious actors.
Malicious scanners. We observed that ATG port is the most scanned by
malicious actors, even more than well-known ICS protocols such as BACnet/IP,
Modbus/TCP, and DNP3. Remote access to the control port of an ATG could
provide an attacker the ability to reconfigure alarm thresholds, reset the system,
and to disrupt the operation of the fuel tank [30, 36]. However, since ATG is
mainly used in the USA, this amount of scan traffic can be due to port 10001
shared with other services. According to [34] several malware leverages this port
to spread over the devices, furthermore Shodan reports that almost all the de-
vices with such exposed port are network antennas.
6.2 IT Traffic
We identified that more than 91.6% of the industrial endpoints were also com-
municating via non-industrial protocols. This can be due to the use of more
than one protocol by a single device or by the presence of a NAT on the network
border that manages the traffic incoming or outgoing from the enterprise and
manufacturing zone. In the first column of Table 6 we reported that almost half
of the traffic consists of encrypted TLS traffic, which could be due to the use
of HTTP over TLS or to other secure communications such as VPNs. More-
over, HTTP covers 41.3% of the overall traffic, DNS covers 0.1%, while others
interesting findings not mentioned in the table that represents less than 1% are
OpenVPN, ESP, Wireguard, STUN, BitTorrent, FTP, and Telnet.
Due to the high amount of non-Industrial Traffic, we investigated if such
behavior happened also between two endpoints of a legitimate ICS communica-
tion. We found out that 69.5% of the legitimate ICS endpoints exchange also
non-Industrial Traffic. In order to have a clear view of the identified protocols,
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Packet-based Flow-based
Overall ICS-to-ICS Overall ICS-to-ICS
Before
IANA
mapping
Protocol % Protocol % Protocol % Protocol %
TLS 50.7 UDP 47.5 TLS 45 TCP 17.8
HTTP 41.3 TCP 40.1 HTTP 23.7 TLS 15.8
UDP 4.8 OpenVPN 8.8 TCP 18.4 UDP 8.2
TCP 2.7 TLS 1.8 UDP 6.7 ICMP 4.1
DNS 0.1 SIP 1.2 ICMP 3 RTCP 3.1
After
IANA
mapping
TLS 50.7 TCP 36.4 TLS 42.9 TLS 1
HTTP 41.3 UDP 16 HTTP 22.6 TCP 0.6
STUN 3.5 OpenVPN 8.8 XMPP 6.6 UDP 0.4
XMPP 1.7 RSF-1 clustering 5.4 HP V.ROOM 5.5 Reserved 0.4
UDP 0.8 ActiveSync 2.4 TCP 3.2 ICMP 0.3
Table 6: Top-5 non-industrial protocols.
we applied a flow-based approach, since the high amount of packets sent from a
single host could affect significantly the statistics. As we can see in Table 6, this
behavior is strongly evident in the amount of HTTP traffic, where just 23.7%
of the hosts were using the HTTP protocol with respect to 41.3% found on
the packet-based approach. Moreover, to reduce the number of the not precisely
tagged TCP protocol, we mapped the lower port of each communication with
the corresponding port registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Author-
ity (IANA). This approach significantly changed the results of the flow-based
approach for the two ICS-endpoints analysis. We must also note that the low
percentages obtained are due to the high frequency to which some ports changed
within the same communication.
6.3 Validation
In order to verify the correct functioning of our environment, we injected our
self-crafted traffic to the IXP. To do this, we deployed a Modbus/TCP server
and a Mosquitto [22] MQTT broker in an Amazon EC2 server instance. Instead,
within the IXP network we deployed a synchronous Modbus/TCP and a MQTT
client based on pymodbus [29] and paho-mqtt [26] python modules. During the
communication between clients and servers, the Modbus client sends a Write
Single Register request and the MQTT client sends a Publish Message request.
Considering that the 3-way handshakes were already accomplished, the overall
amount of packets for each transaction is the following:
– Modbus/TCP:
1. Client sends Write Single Register request;
2. Server sends Write Single Register response;
3. Client sends TCP ACK to server;
– MQTT:
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1. Client sends Publish Message request;
2. Server sends TCP ACK to client;
We sent 10 Write Single Register and 10 Publish Message requests per sec-
ond for 24 hours. In this particular topology, the sFlow Agent samples just the
traffic outgoing from the IXP network. It resulted in 2572852 overall packets
exchanged, 1477915 outgoings and 346 of which were successfully sampled: 164
MQTT requests, 91 Modbus/TCP requests and 91 TCP ACK of the Modbus
communication. Furthermore, all the packets were correctly dissected by Wire-
shark. The sampling rate computed as the ratio between the sampled packets
and the overall outgoing traffic results in about 2.3411 ⋅ 10−4 packets, which is
what we expected, considering a sFlow sampling rate of 2
−12
. This validation
confirms the correct functioning of our IXP environment, the correct sampling
functioning of sFlow and the correct dissection function of the network packets
by Wireshark.
7 Discussion
Approaches Comparison. Our traffic analysis approach give us a very differ-
ent point of view with respect to Shodan approach. While Shodan collects data
performing, for instance, active port scanning and fingerprinting of the exposed
services, having thus a wider overview of the exposed hosts, our approach allows
to identify hosts that are currently active and communicating. In fact, only 2 of
the overall amount of hosts identified by Shodan are actively performing indus-
trial communication. This may be due because the ports were hidden behind a
firewall, a NAT or VLAN. Furthermore, the 98.8% of the ICS that we were able
to identify were not recognized as ICS by Shodan. The 50% of the ICS protocols
identified in the legitimate traffic were not implementing any kind of encryption
mechanism, due to insecure protocols by design (e.g., Modbus/TCP) or bad
configurations (i.e., MQTT, AMQP), exposing the whole systems to potential
attacks. However, we must take into consideration that these devices may also
be Honeypots. The 91.6% of hosts that exchange both Industrial traffic and non-
Industrial traffic could be exploited by an attacker to investigate which protocols
are used and what is the payload of the packets. For instance, the attacker could
gather information about the servers that are commonly involved, analyze the
DNS, FTP and HTTP content to collect information about the employees and
use social engineering techniques to spoof them.
Limitations. However our approach has some limitations. The sFlow protocol
has a physical limitation due to the sampling rate, therefore we cannot have a
complete overview of the Industrial traffic. Moreover, the sFlow protocol trun-
cates the packets at 128 bytes. This last limit, together with the lack in Wire-
shark dissector of specific protocols, may lead to not an incomplete analysis of
the traffic, in particular it could lead to false negatives samples. Finally, if a host
implements a dynamic port range, instead of using the standard ports reported
in Table 7, both our approach and Shodan approach scanning fail to correctly
identify the host because both the approaches are port-based.
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8 Related Work
ICS Security. The security of ICS is a widely studied research topic. Many
research groups study new security solutions to implement in order to mitigate
the threats on which ICSs are exposed to. A low cost and effective solution is
represented by the Anomaly detection systems. Anomaly detection systems do
not require any hardware substitution from the point of view of the company,
indeed their aim is to passively monitor the state of the system, focusing for
example on the physical state of the network [7], network traffic [4] or considering
both of them [8], and raising an alert when the normal behavior of the system
is violated.
Scan-Based Analysis. If, on one hand, there are many contributions in lit-
erature which present security solutions for the ICSs, on the other hand, there
are not many contributions that analyze their current security implementation.
Several works [1,2,11,17,19] leveraged public available information, like Shodan,
to identify internet-reachable industrial devices, while [21] and [15] manually
performed an active scan of the IPv4 address space. For a better understanding
of the threat landscape, Serbanescu et al. [31] deployed a low-interaction hon-
eynet, showing also how the number of attacks increased after being indexed by
Shodan.
Industrial Traffic Analysis. For what concerns Industrial Traffic analysis,
there is not much contribution literature. In [23] the authors, investigated the
industrial communications passing through an IXP and an Internet Service
Provider (ISP). During their analysis, they were able, via correlation techniques,
to identify scanning activities, possible firewall implementation other than un-
protected Industrial Traffic. In our work we are not interested in implementing
any new tool for identifying Industrial Traffic, however we wanted to exploit
a wider range of protocols so we proposed a slightly different packet filtering
process to identify possible Industrial communications and more scanning activ-
ities. Furthermore, from a security point of view we analyzed the critical issues
deriving from implementing both Industrial and non-Industrial communication
within the same network infrastructure and we argued what are the Shodan and
Shodan-like services limits compared to a wide-view analysis of sampled traffic.
9 Conclusions
The increasing using of insecure industrial protocols through the Internet ex-
posed ICS and critical infrastructure to a wide range of cyber threats. Active
scanning of the IP address space performed by services such as Shodan is a
common practice to detect exposed ICS, however it does not properly represent
the real ICS landscape. In this paper, we addressed three research questions to
investigate the current state of the art implementation of the Industrial systems.
To do this, we proposed, implemented and validated an analytic framework to
detect legitimate Industrial Traffic communication and scanning activities, based
on a 31 days long sampled traffic capture collected at a local IXP. We compared
16 G. Barbieri et al.
our results with the information available on Shodan, proving that Shodan is not
enough. In fact, while Shodan was able to identify a higher number of hosts, it
detected only 1.2% of the hosts found by us. We also shown that 64.3% of the
hosts have IT services exposed, 11 of which have an alarming CVE vulnerability
score and 75.6% of the Industrial protocols implemented to communicate over
the Internet do not implement any security feature.
Additional analysis, such as the analysis of the IT traffic confirmed the con-
vergence of the Information Technology and Operational Technology networks in
many systems (in our case the 91.6% of the identified hosts), providing a deeper
point of view of the network architecture and security, such as the high rate
of unencrypted IT traffic and insecure protocols. These network vulnerabilities
could be exploited by malicious users which, as our results show, are constantly
performing scanning campaigns. Finally, we validated our system model by auto-
injecting our traffic showing that it respects our assumptions.
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Appendix A Protocols Identified
In the following Appendix, we reported further details about the protocols we
identified during our analysis. In particular, in Table 7 we reported the complete
list of the industrial protocols of our interest, the communication ports used and
if the current version of Wireshark (currently version is 3.0.5-1) is able to dissect
them. Instead, in Figure 3 we reported the number of packets identified for each
protocol both for the legitimate traffic and for the scanning activities.
Appendix B Scanning activities origins
In this Appendix, we reported an analysis of the origin of the source IPs of the
packets marked as scanning activities. We reported in Figure 4 an heatmap with
the origin of the IP associated with each scanning packet. The scanning activities
come from 30 different countries. The 24.4% of the malicious actors come from
China, 22% Netherlands, 12% Italy, 10% USA and 7% Russia, while 8 other
countries count for less than 5%. However, we must note that the authors of the
scanning campaigns could also hide their source by using, for instance, a VPN,
in that case, the IP origin represented in the map corresponds to the last VPN
hop.
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Protocol Port Ranges Wireshark %legit %scan %mscan
TCP UDP
AMQP 5671-5672 - ✓ 27.1 2.7 3.9
ANSI C12.22 1153 1153 ✓ 21.4 0.2 0.6
Automated Tank Gauge 10001 - 6.8 19.3
BACnet/IP - 47808 ✓ 10.3 5.8
CoAP 5683 5683 ✓ 0.3 50.2 13.5
Codesys 2455 - 0.8 1.3
Crimson v3 789 - 1.1 1.9
DNP3 20000 20000 ✓ 4.8 9.7
EtherCAT 34980 34980 ✓ 1.5 0.2
Ethernet/IP 44818 2222 ✓ 0.7 0.9
FL-net - 55000-55003 0.3 0.6
FF HSE 1089-1091 1089-1091 ✓ 0.1 2.4
GE-SRTP 18245-18246 - 1.6 3.9
HART IP 5094 5094 ✓ 0.8
ICCP 102 - ✓ 2.7 14.2
IEC60870-5-104 2404 - ✓ 0.7 0.9 5.2
IEC61850 102 - ✓ 2.7 14.2
Modbus/TCP 502 - ✓ 9.1 2.1 3.9
MELSEC-Q 5007 5006 1.7 1.3
MQTT 1883,8883 - ✓ 28 1.5 5.2
Niagara Fox 1911,4911 - 2.9 5.8
OMRON FINS - 9600 ✓ < 0.1
OPC UA 4840 - ✓ 0.3 0.9
PCWorx 1962 - 1 2.6
ProConOS 20547 20547 0.9
PROFINET 34962-34964 34962-34964 ✓ 2.7 0.7 1.3
S7comm 102 - ✓ 2.7 14.2
Zigbee IP 17754-17756 17754-17756 ✓ 8.1 0.7
Table 7: Industrial protocols with relative ports, Wireshark dissector availability
( ✓ = wireshark is able to dissect it) and the traffic percentages identified dur-
ing the analysis (%legit legitimate traffic, %scan scanning activities and %mscan
malicious scanning activities).
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Fig. 3: Protocols found among the legitimate and scanning ICS traffic. The X-
axis is log-scaled.
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Fig. 4: Heatmap of the malicious scanning activities origin.
